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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2017  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [EUN](#) [NATO](#) [CY](#) [TU](#)  
SUBJECT: CYPRIOTS DODGE AND WEAVE ON TURKISH DEMANDS FROM  
ESDP

REF: A. ANKARA 1232 B. ANKARA 1192

Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Unit Chief Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary. Cyprus responds to Turkish concerns within ESDP by citing its own litany of grievances against Ankara. Any meaningful change in Turkey's status within ESDP requires Council approval, thus being subject to veto. There is no visible pressure being exerted by major Member States on Nicosia, despite German Presidency engagement. Cyprus expects to participate in both the Kosovo and Afghanistan ESDP missions. The Cypriots will accept the NATO-EU Technical Arrangements provided they can remain below the political-level radar screen. End summary.

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Examining the Turkish Demands  
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¶2. (C) POLMINCOUNS and Pol-Mil chief met May 23 with Ambassador Costas Miliatiades, Cypriot Ambassador to the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) to get a sense of the parameters of the EU's ability to address Turkey's grievances about its treatment within the structures of ESDP. Miliatiades, described to us by (Greek) PSC colleagues as reasonable and relatively open, clearly welcomed the contact. He said he could not comment definitively on Ankara's demands because he had not "formally been made aware of them." He complained that Ankara had made selective demarches to a small group of member states, and that he had not seen their points. He was clearly aware of Ankara's concerns, however, and implicitly acknowledged that some of Ankara's demands were legitimate -- specifically, access to the European Defense Agency and a Security Agreement with the EU -- and that Nicosia had vetoed them because of the broader political problems between Cyprus and Turkey. Other Turkish demands constituted over-reaching, he maintained, and implied a status with respect to the EU that Turkey does not enjoy. We have heard this same formulation from senior EU officials within the ESDP structures.

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A Litany of Counter-Grievances  
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¶3. (C) Miliatiades then produced a six-page paper entitled "Turkey's Persistent Vetoing of Cyprus Membership in International Organizations, Arrangements, Regimes and

Treaties." He also presented us with a non-paper on "Cyprus' Participation in and exclusions from ESDP," and the points of an EU demarche to Ankara urging admission of Cyprus to the Wassenaar arrangement. He said the purpose of citing these Turkish vetoes was to make the point that the current dispute over Turkey's role within ESDP was part of the larger political context related to the Cyprus question.

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Few Prospects for Reversing the Spiral  
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¶4. (C) In an effort to gauge the dimensions of a possible package that could begin to reverse the downward spiral of tit-for-tat obstructionism by both Ankara and Nicosia, we asked if there was any domestic political willingness to reexamine the question of a Turkey-EU Security Agreement -- one of Ankara's key frustrations. He said that he saw no advantage in "treating a political problem as a technical issue," but also hinted that political timing was also a factor. Militiades pointed out that Cyprus is already in a "pre-election" phase, with voting scheduled for February 2008. He pointed out that the Communists are opposed to any concession to Ankara, and that President Papadopoulos will need Communist support to win the election. Following the election, some package of positive gestures might be more possible. He said he was not sure it would soon be possible to reverse the downward spiral, but he was hopeful that, at least, it could be kept from going any lower.

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Cyprus to Participate in ESDP Missions  
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¶5. (C) Militiades told us that Cyprus planned to contribute to both the Kosovo and Afghanistan ESDP missions. Nicosia

will offer a small number of police officers for the Kosovo mission and proposes to provide diplomats to support reform of key ministries as part of the Afghanistan mission. This decision reflected a desire in Nicosia for Cyprus to play a fuller and more active role in issues related to European security concerns.

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On the Ground Arrangements  
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¶6. (C) Militiades said that Nicosia was willing to accept the technical arrangements agreed by NATO and EU at the staff-to-staff level, so long as these arrangements were designed to facilitate "on the ground" cooperation between commanders. (Note: The presence of Cypriot officers within the ESDP mission could complicate communication and information exchange between the EU mission and KFOR under a strict application of the NATO-EU Security Agreement - to which Cyprus and Malta are not parties. End Note.) He said that he felt comfortable that the necessary information would flow as needed to ensure security and operational effectiveness. He implied that Nicosia would object if the arrangements were put before the NAC and PSC for political-level approval.

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Cyprus in PfP?  
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¶7. (C) Militiades, speaking strictly personally, hinted that a Cypriot application to join PfP might not be out of the question. He voiced appreciation for USNATO Ambassador Nuland's positive comments at a February 26 informal session of the NAC-PSC welcoming the presence of all 32 European representatives at the table. He said that if Cyprus took the step to apply for PfP, it should be with the understanding that it would be a full step predicated on

meaningful participation. In this vein, he dismissed the idea of negotiating a security agreement with NATO merely in order to gain greater access to deliberative fora.

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Comment  
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¶18. (C) Miliotiades reacted to Turkish concerns much as we anticipated, by reciting his own litany of complaints against Ankara. Although Miliotiades seemed genuine in stressing that the priority was to ensure that "lives were not endangered" on the ground in Kosovo and Afghanistan by artificial obstacles to information sharing, neither did he see any likelihood of flexibility in Cypriot positions. This tracks with a separate conversation with the German PSC ambassador this week, who told us that the German Presidency had tried to broker a deal involving a reciprocal signing of security agreements -- Turkey with the EU and Cyprus with NATO -- which would have facilitated cooperation between the EU and NATO. However, both countries had rejected the idea of this "technical" solution.

Consequently, the German continued, there was little appetite among major EU Member States to put pressure on Cyprus now. First, he said, pressure from other MS would not work as long as the Cypriots could fall back on both Greek support and its right of veto of Council decisions. Second, there was little inclination to go out on a limb for Turkey as long it failed to demonstrate any real flexibility itself.

¶19. Comment Continued. In the immediate term, therefore both Cyprus and the German presidency in Brussels are pinning their hopes on the technical solution of an agreement in the field that avoids a formal PSC debate. Neither sees an opportunity for a larger package. Even after the Turkish and Cypriot elections, this looks problematic absent a push from an honest broker with credibility and clout on both sides.

McKinley

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